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Dear Science of the Self Attendees, 
 
 
We hope you enjoy reading through the abstracts for the Science of the Self: The 
Agency and Body Representation Research Forum.  
Agency and body representation are growing areas of interest in the human 
sciences. As a field we are trying to answer important questions about how we 
perceive our selves and our interactions with the world. We are thankful for your 
participation and contributions. These have allowed us to put together an 
exciting program across 3 days, where we will have 4 keynote presentations, 22 
talks and 35 poster presentations.  
 
We wish you a great conference and stimulating discussions!  
The Science of the Self Organising Committee  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Vince Polito               Regine Zopf               Simmy Poonian       Mariia Kaliuzhna  
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Keynotes 4
Keynote Presenters and Abstracts 
 
 
Frédérique de Vignemont 
Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris NYU/Paris 
fvignemont@gmail.com  
 
Frédérique de Vignemont is a CNRS Research Director at the Institut Jean-
Nicod in Paris, France where she heads the BoSS (Body, Space, and the 
Self) research group. Her training has been both in philosophy (at the Jean-
Nicod Institute, Paris and at the department of philosophy, NYU) and in 
cognitive science (at the Institute of Cognitive Science, Lyon and at the 
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, London). She did her PhD with Pierre 
Jacob on the question of immunity to error through misidentification 
(Who’s who? Self, agency and ownership, EHESS, 2002). She is interested in self-consciousness and disorders 
of agency and ownership.  Her new book Mind the body: a philosophical exploration of bodily self-awareness 
(Oxford University Press) will be out later this year. She has also edited a multidisciplinary volume on the 
body and the self, The Subject’s Matter (MIT press) to appear later this year. 
 
The Bodyguard hypothesis of the sense of bodily ownership 
 
I feel the hand that is typing as my own but what grounds such a feeling? Here I will defend a reductionist 
approach, according to which the sense of ownership can be reduced to some specific properties of bodily 
experiences. But which properties? I will first discuss Martin’s (1993, 1995) conception, according to which 
the sense of bodily ownership finds its origin in the spatial awareness of the boundaries of one’s body. I will 
argue that such spatial awareness is not sufficient. I will then analyse whether the sense of bodily ownership 
can borrow, so to speak, its self-referentiality from the self-referentiality of agency. More specifically, one 
may suggest that the sense of bodily ownership is grounded in the sensorimotor representation of the body 
known as body schema. However, this agentive hypothesis faces a number of difficulties that cannot be 
solved without further refinements. In particular, I will argue that one needs to distinguish between two 
distinct kinds of body schema: the working body schema involved in instrumental actions, and the protective 
body schema involved in self-defence. I will then propose what may be conceived as an affective conception 
of the sense of bodily ownership, according to which the sense of bodily ownership consists in the awareness 
of the boundaries of one’s body as having a special significance for the self. This will lead me to define the 
phenomenology of ownership as a narcissistic feeling to file with other affective feelings such as the feeling 
of familiarity. 
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Matthew Longo 
Birkbeck, University of London 
m.longo@bbk.ac.uk  
 
Matthew Longo studied at the University of California at Berkeley and the 
University of Chicago before moving to University College London as a 
postdoctoral researcher in 2006. In 2010 he moved to Birkbeck, University 
of London, where he is now Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience and 
Director of the Body Representation Laboratory. Prof Longo’s research 
investigates the psychological and neural mechanisms by which we form 
representations of our body, and how these representations affect all aspects of our mental lives, using a 
range of methods from experimental psychology, perceptual psychophysics, and cognitive neuroscience.  
 
Distorted body representations in healthy adults  
 
Misperceptions and delusions about one's own body are characteristic of numerous psychiatric and 
neurological conditions. Such phenomena have long fascinated researchers, in large part because of their 
sheer strangeness. Our body is so ubiquitous in our perceptual experience and so intimately known to us, it 
is difficult to imagine not having accurate knowledge of it. In this talk, I will discuss several recent 
experiments that have shown, in striking contrast to this intuition, that our brain maintains highly distorted 
representations of the body, used for perceptual tasks including position sense and tactile size perception. 
 
 
 
Jakob Hohwy  
Monash University, Melbourne 
jakob.hohwy@monash.edu  
 
Jakob Hohwy is a philosopher engaged in both conceptual and 
experimental research. He works on problems in philosophy of mind about 
perception, neuroscience, and mental illness. At the same time, he 
collaborates with neuroscientists and psychiatrists, conducting 
experiments that put philosophical ideas to the test and that bring 
philosophical concerns into the lab. 
 
 
Why should any body have a (real) self?  
 
In a recent work, John Michael and I develop a realist position about the self: the self is real, it is a set of 
causes in the world forming part of a model generating predictions of sensory input. In this sense, the self is 
a self-model and, at the same time, a set of real causes. When set in the context of the free energy principle 
this proposal becomes particularly appealing because several subtle aspects of the self can then emerge. In 
this talk I explain and elaborate on our proposal. I connect it to agency and body representations, and explore 
possible relations to psychopathology and false inference. I also defend it against several recent criticisms 
and discuss it in the context of a broader debate about narrative accounts of the self. 
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Neeltje van Haren  
UMC Brain Centre Rudolf Magnus, Utrecht 
n.e.m.vanharen@umcutrecht.nl  
 
Neeltje van Haren is an Associate Professor at the University Medical Centre 
Utrecht. Her research investigates the neurobiological and (social) cognitive 
basis of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, using experimental cognitive 
paradigms, neuroimaging, and family designs. A particular interest has been 
the cognitive and neural basis of (abnormal) self-agency experiences in 
healthy individuals, schizophrenia patients and their offspring. Associate 
Professor van Haren’s lab has convincingly shown that patients are not using 
implicitly available information from the environment about action outcomes to experience self-agency over 
such outcomes. 
 
Self-agency experiences in schizophrenia  
 
The feeling that we cause our own actions and resulting outcomes is natural to us. When I shout my friend’s 
name, he looks over his shoulder and laughs. It is clear my actions caused him to do so. Such experiences 
are fundamental for social communication and interaction, are usually automatic and need no attention. 
However, schizophrenia patients often experience no control over their behaviour and exhibit difficulties in 
distinguishing one’s own actions and outcomes from those of others. They hear voices speaking to them or 
feel their limbs being controlled by external sources. A friend looks over his shoulder because he thinks you 
smell, not because you called for him.  In my lab we investigate the cognitive processes and brain areas that 
underlie self-agency and how self-agency relates to social functioning and schizophrenia symptoms. While, 
most studies on abnormal agency processing in schizophrenia patients initiated from the motor prediction 
model and have shown impairments herein. My lab was the first to administer a self-agency paradigm in this 
population that was based on non-motor or cognitive  
processes. In my talk, I will present our findings on agency processing, its clinical and functional implications, 
and neural correlates in patients with schizophrenia. 
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Methods Workshop Speakers:  
Human Perspectives in the Science of Self 
 
Colin Klein 
Macquarie University, Sydney 
cvklein@gmail.com  
 
Colin Klein is an ARC Future Fellow and a Senior Lecturer in the Department of 
Philosophy at Macquarie University. He is an Associate Investigator at the ARC Centre 
of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD) and a member of the University 
Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics (CAVE), both also hosted at Macquarie 
University. He received his PhD in philosophy from Princeton University in 2007. He 
works in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, especially where they 
intersect in philosophy of psychology.  
 
Mining Text for Fun and Profit 
 
Large corpora of online texts present unique opportunities for cognitive psychologists to analyse individual 
attitudes in natural settings. Drawing on work I and others have done on conspiracy theories, I will discuss 
tools and analysis strategies for psychologically-oriented corpus analysis, as well as some of the broader 
strengths and weaknesses of these approaches. 
 
 
Melita Giummarra  
Monash University, Melbourne 
melita.giummarra@monash.edu.au  
 
Dr Melita Giummarra is a research fellow in the Pre-hospital, Emergency and Trauma 
Group, Department of Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine, Monash University. 
Since completing a Bachelor of Arts (University of Melbourne, 2002) and PhD (Monash 
University, 2011) in Psychological Sciences, she has published more than fifty peer-
reviewed publications, received more than $1.5M in funding, and has been supported 
by fellowships from the NHMRC (Early Career Fellowship, 2012-16) and ARC 
(Discovery Early Career Research Award, 2017-20). Dr Giummarra’s research 
principally focusses on the social context of pain and suffering, and the persistence of pain and mental health 
conditions after traumatic injury. She uses a range of research methods from psychophysics and neuroimaging through 
to epidemiological big data analysis, geospatial mapping of population data, and narrative text analysis to better 
understand mechanisms of pain and mental health at a biological, psychological and social systems level. While her 
research predominantly involves collaboration with transport compensation systems and government health 
departments to bring about improvements in the systems serving injured persons, she retains a deep curiosity for the 
mechanisms and manifestations of phantom limb experience, which was the focus of her doctoral studies. 
 
Phantom limb representation: Insights from the illusion of apparent motion and solidarity 
constraints   
 
Phantom limbs are experienced as the phenomenal persistence of postural, sensorimotor features of an 
amputated limb. Using the paradigm of apparent motion perception, we investigated perceived limb motion 
through solidity constraints, examining whether the illusion varied in amputees who experience obstacle 
shunning in everyday life or not. The apparent motion paradigm revealed that some phenomenal aspects of 
phantom limb experience - especially the way that the limb is represented in relation to objects in 
peripersonal space - may rest on visual-sensorimotor interactions in limb representations, which could 
critically influence everyday phantom limb experiences (e.g., with prosthesis adjustment).  
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Simmy Poonian 
ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Macquarie 
University, Sydney 
simmy.poonian@gmail.com  
 
Simmy Poonian is a postdoctoral fellow in the Belief Formation Program at the ARC 
Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD). She completed her PhD at 
the Queensland Brain Institute (QBI) at The University of Queensland and conducted 
a post-doctoral fellowship at Universite Paris Descartes. Simmy investigates the way 
in which our brain is able to plan and execute everyday movements and is 
particularly interested in the ways the predictions we form about ourselves and the 
world, influence aspects of action control, action-effect processing, observation of others’ actions and attributions of 
causality.  
 
Implicit measures of agency: Intentional binding and EEG   
 
Our ability to change and control our environment through our own intentions and movements has made 
us able to adapt the world to suit ourselves. This control or sense of agency we have over our goal-directed 
actions and their sensory outcomes is fundamental to human experience. Theoretical accounts suggest that 
the sense of agency involves an implicit, pre-reflective process and an explicit, conscious experience. In this 
talk I will explore behavioural and neural measures of implicit agency, which utilize the intentional binding 
paradigm, a temporal measure of actions and their outcomes. I will explore the distinction made between 
self and other actions and share insights into designing experiments to measure this phenomenon.  
 
 
Robert Tobin Keys 
ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Macquarie 
University, Sydney 
robert-aaron.keys@hdr.mq.edu.au 
 
Robert Keys received a Philosophy degree from the University of Wollongong 
(2013), in which he wrote an honours thesis on theoretical models of perceptual 
experience, and received a Masters of Research in Cognitive Science from 
Macquarie University (2016). Robert’s research aims are to understand the 
cognitive processes combining sensory information across modalities, which allow 
us to perceive coherent representations of our bodies. In particular, he uses 
psychophysical methods to examine how own-body perception affects our perception of the outside world. He is also 
interested in non-frequentist, Bayesian statistical methods and the movement towards open science. 
 
Dealing with the numbers: measuring perception, behaviour, and theory in body 
representation research 
 
In order to inform scientific theory, experimental data must be interpreted. Although this presents a basic 
problem for all scientific disciplines, we face particular difficulties as researchers investigating agency and 
body representation. This is partly due to the enormous range of methods available for studying the mind—
from single-cell recording to individual reports of subjective experience—and partly due to the tacit 
assumptions in our interpretation of empirical data. In this talk, I will discuss the use of psychophysics and 
proprioceptive judgments to measure aspects of own-body perception, and highlight the assumptions 
and reasoning behind their use. Further, I will discuss Bayesian approaches to statistical analysis, and how 
these methods require us to be more explicit about how experimental data support our scientific theories.
 Talk Abstracts (in presentation order)  
 
Sensory and non-sensory factors affecting hand localisation under visuo-proprioceptive incongruence 
Valeria Bellan, Helen Gilpin, Roger Newport, Tasha R. Stanton, Alberto Gallace, Lilja K. Dagsdóttir, Felicity A. 
Braithwaite and G. Lorimer Moseley 
University of South Australia; University of Nottingham; University of Milano Bicocca; Aarhus University; Neuroscience Research 
Australia 
valeria.bellan@unisa.edu.au 
 
In the past few years, we investigated the effect of sensory incongruence on body localisation. Specifically, 
we employed a piece of equipment called MIRAGE (Newport & Gilpin 2012) with which we were able to 
create a mismatch between the ‘visually encoded’ and ‘proprioceptively encoded’ position of the 
participants’ hands. In other words, the participants thought their hands were close together, while they 
were in fact far apart, because of a strong reliance on visual cues. Over a number of different experiments, 
we investigated self-localisation under sensory incongruence, as well as its relationship with the sense of 
ownership. Importantly, we examined how different external non-sensory (Exp. 1) and sensory (Exp. 2 to 6) 
cues, as well as awareness of the sensory mismatch (Exp. 7) could affect the update of the sensory motor 
system (i.e. allowing a more accurate localisation of the hand). Interestingly enough, the only cues  able to 
realign the proprioceptively- and visually-driven hand localisation appear to be a non-informative movement 
of the contralateral hand (Exp. 7) and time (i.e. over time the participants become more accurate) (Exp. 1). 
In our most recent study (Exp. 5-6), we delivered on the target hand both painful and non-painful stimuli. 
Our hypothesis was that a salient stimulus, such as a painful one, would accelerate the reliance on 
proprioception, therefore inducing more accurate hand localisation. Our findings did not support our 
hypothesis. Furthermore, exploratory analysis of the data suggests an analgesic effect during the illusion.   
 
 
Sensing Touch in Empty Space: The Disconnected Hand Illusion 
Jared Medina 
University of Delaware, USA 
jmedina@psych.udel.edu 
 
Can someone embody a “disconnected” hand, and feel touch outside of their body? We developed a novel 
version of the mirror box illusion to explore this question. In the large mirror condition (as in a typical mirror 
box experiment), participants could see the reflection of both their left hand and forearm. In contrast, in the 
small mirror condition, participants saw only the reflection of their left hand with empty space where their 
forearm should be. Bimanual synchronous finger-tapping in this condition created illusory embodiment of 
the mirror-reflected hand sans-forearm, and (at times) the sense that their forearm was in empty space. In 
a series of experiments, we presented tactile stimuli to their unseen right hand or distal forearm, and asked 
participants to report whether they felt touch on/near the mirror reflection of their hand, or at the actual 
location of their right arm. First, participants reported embodying the “disconnected” hand on more than 
half of the trials. However, even when the mirror hand was embodied, participants often reported touch at 
the proprioceptively-defined location. Interestingly, on approximately 20% of forearm stimulation trials with 
the small mirror, participants reported feeling touch in the empty space where the forearm would be 
expected. In a follow-up experiment, we found that on half of these trials, participants felt that the forearm 
was in its actual location, yet still experienced touch in empty space.  We discuss how embodiment of the 
disconnected hand, combined with expectations derived from higher-order body representations, leads to 
this illusion. 
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Whose Hand? An illusion of self-touch and stubborn proprioceptive drift 
Tatjana Seizova-Cajic, Emma Stuart and Janet Taylor 
University of Sydney; University of Linkoping; NeuRA and Edith Cowan University 
tatjana.seizova-cajic@sydney.edu.au 
 
The frequency with which we experience self-touch, especially between our fingers and hands, may create 
a bias to perceive it even when touched by someone else. Here we describe simple stimulus conditions that 
reveal this bias, resulting in a peculiar experience. Method: Blindfolded participant (n=12) sat with elbows 
on the table, hands up in the air, and outstretched fingers. Experimenter sitting opposite had a similar 
posture and made contact with the participant’s hands via (a) outstretched fingers on both hands; (b) one 
fist, one hand with outstretched fingers; (c) two fists. The posture was maintained for 7 min, during which 
time participants had two tasks: 1. to report whose hands/fingertips they perceived they were touching 
(every 30 s); 2. to judge the relative position between light touches delivered on the back of their hands 
(every 6 s). The latter task was an indirect measure of illusory proprioceptive drift. Results: Self-touch illusion 
was reported by 75%, 50% and 25% of participants in conditions a, b and c, respectively, with shortest 
median time-to-illusion in condition a, 3 min. Proprioceptive drift gradually brought participants' hands 
opposite each other in all three conditions, while their real displacement along the midsagittal plane was 
more than 10 cm. Conclusion: An illusion of self-touch occurs with prolonged exposure to other hands in a 
symmetrical posture. This illusion would be a plausible cause of the proprioceptive drift observed, had the 
drift not preceded the illusion and occurred also when the illusion did not, suggesting an independent cause.  
 
 
 
 
 
Feeling stiffness in the back: a protective perceptual inference in chronic back pain 
Tasha R Stanton (1,2),  G Lorimer Moseley (1,2),  Arnold Y L Wong (3,4) and Gregory N Kawchuk (3) 
1) The Sansom Institute for Health Research, School of Health Sciences The University of South Australia and PainAdelaide, 
Adelaide, SA, Australia; 2) Neuroscience Research Australia, Sydney, NSW, Australia; 3) Department of Physical Therapy, Faculty 
of Rehabilitation Medicine, The University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada; 4) Department of Rehabilitation Sciences, 
Faculty of Health and Social Sciences, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong Special Administration Region, China 
tasha.stanton@unisa.edu.au 
 
Bodily feelings constitute a fundamental aspect of self-awareness and provide critical homeostatic functions 
-- e.g., feeling cold makes one seek warmth; feeling pain makes one seek protection; feeling parched makes 
one drink. We assume that these bodily feelings reflect the biological state of our body tissues -- a ‘read-
out’, so to speak, of somatosensory and visceral input. But do they? This research interrogates the long-held 
question of what informs our subjective experiences of bodily state, namely, does feeling back stiffness 
actually reflect having a stiff back? We propose a new hypothesis: feelings of back stiffness are a protective 
perceptual construct, rather than a reflection of the biomechanical properties of the back. Over three 
experiments, we challenge the prevailing view by showing that feeling stiff does not relate to objective spinal 
measures of stiffness and objective back stiffness does not differ between those who report feeling stiff and 
those who do not. Rather, those who report feeling stiff exhibit self-protective responses: they significantly 
overestimate force applied to their spine, yet are better at detecting changes in this force than those who 
do not report feeling stiff. This perceptual error can be manipulated: providing auditory input in synchrony 
to forces applied to the spine modulates prediction accuracy in both groups, without altering actual stiffness, 
demonstrating that feeling stiff is a multisensory perceptual inference consistent with protection. Together, 
this presents a compelling argument against the prevailing view that feeling stiff is an isomorphic marker of 
the biomechanical characteristics of the back.  
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How the vestibular system anchors the self to the body 
Christophe Lopez 
CNRS and Aix Marseille University, France 
christophe.lopez@univ-amu.fr 
 
I will summarize recent evidence that the vestibular system is involved in the sense of self [1]. In a 
prospective study in 210 patients with dizziness and 210 healthy controls, we showed a significantly higher 
occurrence of out-of-body experience (OBE) in patients (14%) than controls (5%). Most of the patients 
experienced OBE only after they started having dizziness, and OBE were mainly related to peripheral 
vestibular disorders. We suggest that perceptual incoherence and multisensory conflicts, due to erroneous 
vestibular signals about self-motion and orientation, distort the minimal sense of self, including embodiment 
and spatial perspective [2]. This idea was confirmed in patients with chronic bilateral vestibular failure – 
which is not characterized by perceptual incoherence – reporting similar embodied experiences than 
controls. Finally, galvanic vestibular stimulation (GVS) in healthy participants modulated the origin of their 
spatial perspective [3]. Participants reported ambiguous letters (b, d, p, q) traced on their forehead while 
they received low-intensity GVS. GVS increased the likelihood that participants reported letters from an 
embodied viewpoint (i.e. first-person perspective). Low-intensity GVS may have increased the natural 
contribution of the vestibular system to anchoring the self to the body. 
[1] Lopez C. The vestibular system: balancing more than just the body. Curr Opin Neurol 2016;29:74–83.  
[2] Deroualle D, Toupet M, …, Lopez C. Anchoring the self to the body in bilateral vestibular failure. PloS One 2017;12:e0170488.  
[3] Ferrè ER, Lopez C, Haggard P. Anchoring the self to the body: vestibular contribution to the sense of self. Psychol Sci 
2014;25:2106–8.  
 
 
 
Visuo-Vestibular and Cardiovascular Contributions to Vertical Ego-motion Representation  
Irini Giannopulu 
Bond University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Australia 
igiannop@bond.edu.au 
 
Vertical ego-motion, i.e., elevator movement, is an embodied representation of movement in space. It can 
occur in naturalistic situation when, for example, we take a glass walled elevator to move upward or 
downward. Though a rapid waterfall is seeable, we can have the feeling that our body is moving in the 
opposite direction. This ego-motion representation is a complex phenomenon which necessitates 
multimodal visuo-vestibular and cardiovascular interactions at least. It is considered as an archetypal form 
of virtual reality. The purpose of the study is to analyse visuo-vestibular and cardiovascular interactions of 
vertical ego-motion by investigating the latency for reporting upward and downward ego-motion as well as 
the variation of autonomic heart rate in healthy adults. Under the hypothesis that the intensity of the visuo-
vestibular interaction would influence upward and downward ego-motion latency and cardiovascular 
activity, thirty-five healthy adults aged 22 years have been immersed to an optokinetic environment using a 
Head Mounted Display (HMD). During upward and downward ego-motion, the engagement of vestibular 
saccular structures seems differently contribute to latency and cardiovascular activation depending on the 
direction of gravitational acceleration. Downward ego-motion latency is shorter than upward ego-motion 
latency; cardiovascular autonomic activation is lower for downward ego-motion than for upward ego-
motion. These results provide evidence that a top-down organisation associated with multimodal visuo-
vestibular and cardiovascular interactions would afford a neuromorphic basis to apprehend body 
representation. 
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Loss of face: infants' recognition of headless bodies 
Emma L Axelsson, Rachel A Robbins and Julia J Gillett 
The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia 
emma.l.axelsson@gmail.com 
 
Infants discriminate facial identities early in the first year of life and there is mounting evidence that infants 
can discriminate bodies on the basis of structure, proportion of body parts, and even attractiveness. 
However, there is no known evidence of infants’ discrimination of bodies on the basis of identity. When 
facial information is obscured, can infants recognise identities from bodies alone? Nine-month-old infants 
were familiarised to faceless whole figures or headless bodies in an upright or inverted orientation and 
novelty preferences to contrasting identities were assessed. Infants demonstrated a significant novelty 
preference only when headless upright bodies were presented. Novelty preferences were also significantly 
higher in the headless upright condition compared to the headless inverted condition, which is indicative of 
an inversion effect. Eye-tracking data revealed that when whole figures were presented, infants looked 
significantly longer at heads compared to bodies suggesting that heads, despite lacking faces, drew infants’ 
attention from the bodies. Infants’ looking times to bodies were longest in the headless upright condition. 
Infants also looked longer at the feet of inverted stimuli compared to the feet to upright stimuli suggesting 
that infants have an upper bias when presented with human figures. The findings suggest that at 9 months 
of age, infants can recognise people on the basis of bodies, particularly in the absence of head information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Altered bodily sensation of emotion in schizophrenia 
Lénie Torregrossa (1), Matthew Snodgress (1), Lauri Nummenmaa (2) and Sohee Park (1) 
1) Vanderbilt University, USA; 2) Aalto University, Finland 
lenie.j.torregrossa@vanderbilt.edu 
 
Emotional deficit is a core feature of schizophrenia linked to social withdrawal and poor outcome. Emotional 
experiences directly impact bodily states via the musculoskeletal, respiratory, cardiovascular, 
gastrointestinal and endocrine systems. Conversely, bodily sensations are central to emotions.  More 
broadly, bodily sensations form the core of self experiences. Although bodily self-disturbances and impaired 
emotion recognition are both central to schizophrenia, the bodily experience of emotions in relation to 
schizophrenia has not been extensively examined. Individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) and demographically 
matched controls (CO) participated in the EmBODY task to generate bodily sensation maps that correspond 
to bodily activation and deactivation experienced during 14 emotional experiences. Schizotypy in healthy 
participants was assessed with the SPQ-B. Symptoms were measured with SANS and SAPS. In the bodily 
maps, SZ showed less emotional embodiment compared to CO, suggesting a reduced range of bodily 
experience of emotion. In particular, SZ reported less activation for positive emotions and less deactivation 
for negative emotions than CO. Positive symptoms predicted embodiment deficit. Classification accuracy 
analyses revealed lower independence across emotions in SZ compared to CO, which indicates less discrete 
bodily sensation of emotions. When directly comparing the maps of SZ and CO, we found that bodily maps 
of high-arousal emotions (love, fear, anger) were more similar, while some low-arousal emotions were not 
correlated (sadness) or anticorrelated (depression). This suggests a specific deficit of bodily deactivation in 
emotional experience in SZ. Future work will examine the role of autobiographical memory and 
mentalization on bodily self-disturbances and emotional dysfunction in schizophrenia. 
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Effects of dexamphetamine on multisensory body and other illusions in healthy volunteers and their 
relationship to working memory 
Mathew T. Martin-Iverson (1), Lim, J.H. M (1), Loffman, S.J. (1), Slawick, S. (1), Gaus, K. (1), Krakonja, S. (1), 
Hourani, H. (1), Lloyd, R. (1), Lee, J. (2) and Lyyalol, R. (2) 
(1) Pharmacology, School of Biomedical Sciences, University of Western Australia; (2) WA North Metropolitan Health Services- 
Mental Health, Perth, Australia 
mathew.martin-iverson@uwa.edu.au 
 
Perception of both uni- and multi-modal multisensory events and objects involves the integration of various 
stimuli over time and space. This integration is critical to the perception one's self. There is some evidence 
that the temporal binding window for multisensory integration is widened in people with schizophrenia, 
which is likely a function of increased in basal and stimulated dopamine release. We investigate the effect 
of the dopamine release enhancer, dexamphetamine (0.45 mg/kg, po), in healthy volunteers on a variety of 
illusions in which the interstimulus temporal and spatial intervals of eliciting stimuli were independent 
variables to assess effects on binding windows.  A double-blind, placebo-controlled, counter-balanced cross-
over design was used, to reduce the impact of individual differences in illusion susceptibility. We observed 
significant dexamphetamine effects consistent widening of temporal windows after acute dexamphetamine 
treatment relative to placebo in multimodal illusions (rubber hand, marble hand, McGurk effect), and 
widened windows for both temporal and spatial binding in the unimodal tactile funnelling illusion and visual 
flash illusion. We hypothesised that the width of binding windows may be related to spatial working 
memory, and tested that hypothesis. The preliminary data on those tests, and on a test of the effect of 
dexamphetamine on the spatial binding window in the rubber hand illusion will be available at the workshop.  
 
 
 
 
 
Body size perception in healthy adults can be manipulated using galvanic vestibular stimulation and 
distorted visual exposure 
Sarah D’Amour, Deborah Alexe, Isabella Lim and Laurence R. Harris 
York University, Canada 
saod16@yorku.ca 
 
The brain has an implicit, internal representation of the body that is maintained, adjusted, and updated in 
response to changes in body shape during growth and development. Here, we investigated how perceived 
body size accuracy may be affected when body representation is manipulated. We attempted to alter body 
perception by either having participants look at a distorted image of their own body for five minutes or by 
the use of disruptive galvanic vestibular stimulation (dGVS sum of sines). Participants were tested with the 
body or body parts presented in different viewpoints to see if performance changed for familiar and 
unfamiliar views. The Body Shape Questionnaire (Cooper et al., 1986) was also administered. Accuracy was 
measured using a novel psychophysical method for determining perceived body size that taps into the 
implicit body representation (see Harris and D’Amour conference abstract). The time course of visual 
adaptation effects was measured. Control experiments were also carried out using a familiar inanimate 
object (e.g., a Coke can). Manipulating body representation using both visual and vestibular methods 
resulted in changes to perceived body size accuracy. These results provide insights into how the brain 
represents the body, revealing that body size perception is flexible and plastic. 
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The Role of Gender in Fat and Muscle Aftereffects: Implications for Body Image Disturbance 
Kevin R. Brooks, Edwina Keen, Jonathan Mond, Deborah Mitchison, Richard J. Stevenson  and  Ian D. Stephen 
Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and 
its Disorders, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; Perception in Action Research Centre (PARC), Faculty of 
Human Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; Centre for Emotional Health, Department of 
Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia; Centre for Rural Health, University of Tasmania, 
Launceston, Tasmania, Australia  
kevin.brooks@mq.edu.au 
 
Body size and shape misperception (BSSM) is a significant component of body image disturbance. These 
distressing perceptual distortions are experienced by many members of the general population and 
constitute a risk factor for the development of eating disorders (such as anorexia nervosa) and muscle 
dysmorphia. For several decades, the occurrence of BSSM has been linked to consumption of mainstream 
media promoting unrealistic body standards, which have tended to be relatively gender specific. While male-
directed content tends to emphasize the importance of muscularity, female-directed content primarily 
encourages pursuit of the thin (i.e. low fat) ideal. Recent visual adaptation research has successfully 
simulated BSSM effects in the laboratory by exposing participants to images of bodies that are high or low 
in body fat, causing an aftereffect such that subsequently seen bodies (including the body of the participant) 
appeared unrealistically thin or fat respectively. Similar effects are seen for adaptation to high or low levels 
of muscularity. In this study, we investigated potential gender differences in visual aftereffects to fat and 
muscle. It was expected that male participants would demonstrate larger muscle aftereffects, while females 
would demonstrate larger fat aftereffects. Although these hypotheses were not supported, results showed 
significantly larger fat and muscle aftereffects when participants viewed stimuli corresponding to their own 
gender compared to other gender stimuli. The implications of these findings for visual adaptation models of 
real-world BSSM will be discussed.  
 
 
 
The body shape and volume perception 
Rita Sadibolova 
Birkbeck, University of London, United Kingdom 
rsadib01@mail.bbk.ac.uk 
 
Given the familiarity of our body it may seem surprising how distorted its representation is in healthy adults. 
Here, I present an investigation into distorted body representations which extends the previous literature 
by focusing on the three-dimensionality of the body. The first two experiments concern a metric model of 
the body which shows the distortions characteristic of those in early somatosensory maps and which is 
associated with biases in somatoperception. The internal geometry of tactile perceptual space has been 
investigated before in two-dimensional space with a multi-dimensional scaling technique. By extending this 
approach to three-dimensional space, I constructed the implicit shapes of body parts in order to quantify 
the role of skin-centred versus shape-centred size perception. The method has a potential to investigate, 
and compare between healthy and clinical populations, the role of early somatosensory representations in 
how body shape is construed. The third study concerns the conscious perception of body size. I expanded 
on the research traditionally using one-dimensional or two-dimensional measures in a study comparing the 
one-dimensional size judgements and a perception of body volume in three-dimensional space. Although 
the biases across body parts were similar in magnitude, they were in the opposite direction. Therefore, the 
perceived size of the body appears to be malleable depending on situational or task demands. In all, this 
research contributes to a growing body of evidence showing that our perception of the body size is not 
infallible as well as it adds novel findings by studying the body as a three-dimensional object. 
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Measuring and Manipulating Body Representations in Anorexia Nervosa 
Stephen Gadsby 
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia 
gadsby.st@gmail.com 
 
Recent research suggests that anorexia patients cognitively misrepresent their bodies -- as larger than 
reality. In turn, this may cause them to experience their bodies as oversized, potentially playing a prominent 
role in disease maintenance. In this talk, I explore how we can gain a deeper understanding of these distorted 
body representations, using the twin methods of measurement and manipulation. Over the past few years, 
Longo and colleagues have developed a number of behavioural tasks for measuring the spatial content of 
body representations. I discuss the underlying theory behind these tasks and show how they can be applied 
to measuring anorexia patients’ distorted body size content. I go on to discuss the possibility of manipulating 
this content. It’s long been claimed that the rubber hand illusion manipulates body representation content 
-- specifically, body representations integrate content regarding the rubber hand. I clarify the kind of 
integration involved in rubber hand experiments and offer a novel definition of integration as the 
manipulation of stored content. Finally, I discuss a number of recent rubber hand illusion experiments, 
interpreting their results in light of the discussed notions of measurement and manipulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At Your Fingertips: The Effect of Target Finger, Task Type, and Dual Tasks on Localising Manual Tactile 
Stimuli 
James Brown, Dacey Nguyen, Emily Orchard-Mills and David Alais 
School of Psychology, Faculty of Science, University of Sydney 
jbro5585@uni.sydney.edu.au 
 
Despite the long history of the tactile sense being studied psychophysically, surprisingly few studies have 
concerned identifying the location of tactile stimuli at the hand. Trojan et al. (2014) contend that even fewer 
studies have concerned the localisation of tactile stimuli at the fingertips. The current study features several 
experiments, each with an aim to add clarity to this small battery of findings -- –in particular, if differences 
exist between fingers within a hand and when; if mislocalisation occurs in a biased manner and how; and if 
differential allocation of attentional resources affects given tactile tasks in ways found in tasks of other 
senses. Each experiment in the current study uses vibrotactile stimuli applied to the fingertips. Across all 
experiments, a given task could include a single touch localisation within each hand, temporal order 
judgments for all permutations of pairings within each hand, or a pseudorandom sequence for all fingers 
within each hand. In some experiments, a localisation task is conducted on one hand whilst a simultaneous 
task is conducted on the other -- either localisation or low-level discrimination. Overall, performance and 
sensitivity varies with finger - such that fingers on the periphery are localised more reliably than fingers in 
the centre of a hand -- and with task type -- such that an increase in the number of events and temporal 
cluttering results in poorer outcomes. In dual tasks, the effect of the secondary task is both severe and 
washes out the peripheral benefits observed in the primary task alone. 
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Atypical metacognition and sense of agency in high hypnotic suggestibility 
Devin B. Terhune 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
d.terhune@gold.ac.uk 
 
Multiple theories of hypnosis converge on the proposal that responsiveness to suggestion is facilitated by 
aberrant metacognition. According to such accounts, highly suggestible individuals voluntarily produce 
responses to suggestions but experience them as non-volitional because of impaired awareness of the 
intentions associated with the responses or a deficit in identifying the source of suggestion-specific 
representations. A corollary of this hypothesis is that highly suggestible individuals will have impaired 
metacognition or executive monitoring but the specificity of this effect has not yet been explored. Here I will 
describe multiple studies examining the breadth of atypical monitoring in this population in order to 
determine whether aberrant metacognition is restricted to meta-awareness pertaining to the sense of 
agency and motor intentions or whether it reflects a broader deficit. In particular, I will describe data from 
studies examining metacognition of agency, meta-awareness of attentional states and motor intentions, 
sense of agency, interoception, self-awareness, and source monitoring in highly suggestible individuals and 
controls. The results highlight the specificity of atypical metacognition and monitoring in this group and have 
implications for contemporary models of hypnosis and distortions in the sense of agency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modifying temporal expectations of self-generated sensations with training 
Ruth B Elijah, Mike E Le Pelley and Thomas J Whitford 
University of New South Wales (UNSW), Sydney, Australia 
ruth.elijah@unsw.edu.au 
 
Forward modelling accounts of action effects suggest that predictive processes allow the sensory 
consequences of our actions to be anticipated and subsequently attenuated, which contributes to our sense 
of agency over these sensations. These sensory expectations involve temporal predictions as to the 
anticipated timing of self-generated sensations. It has been hypothesized that humans hold the prior belief 
that sounds should occur immediately after initiating actions. The current study aimed to determine whether 
this temporal expectation could be modified with repeated exposure to a delayed, self-initiated auditory 
sensation. Participants underwent electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings while undergoing a task where 
they pressed a button to produce a tone. The onset of the tone occurred either immediately or 100ms after 
the button press. Training comprised of repeated exposure to the delayed tone, and as a comparison, 
repeated exposure to the immediate tone. Pre- and post- training measures of the evoked response to the 
tone were assessed to determine the effect of training. Pre-training, delayed tones evoked a larger N1 
amplitude compared to immediate tones. However, across two experiments, it was demonstrated that, in 
contrast to training to immediate tones, training to the delayed tone resulted in a reduction in N1 amplitude, 
such that there was no difference in N1 amplitude post-training between the immediate and delayed tones. 
These results suggest that it is possible to modify the neural assumption that sensations follow immediately 
from actions. This findings may have implications for disorders, such as schizophrenia, which are ostensibly 
associated with abnormalities in sensory attenuation. 
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The role of the temporoparietal junction in implicit and explicit sense of agency 
Gethin Hughes 
University of Essex, United Kingdom 
ghughes@essex.ac.uk 
 
The sense of agency refers to the feeling of being in control of one’s actions and their outcomes. This can be 
measured explicitly, by asking people to report their experience of agency, or implicitly by recording the 
perceived time interval between actions and outcomes (temporal binding). The involvement of the left and 
right temporal-parietal junction in both implicit and explicit sense of agency was investigated in two 
experiments. Participants were informed that they could control the volume output of the computer with 
one of two buttons. However, during the experiment the volume of ensuing sound did not always follow this 
expectation. On each trial, participants reported both the perceived time of the tone, and the degree to 
which they felt like they controlled the action outcome. Participants experienced reduced sense of agency 
when the outcome was inconsistent with their action. In contrast, there was no difference in binding 
between congruent and incongruent outcomes. In Experiment 1 anodal transcranial direct current 
stimulation was applied to the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ), while in Experiment 2, stimulation was 
applied to the left TPJ. We observed significant changes in explicit reports of agency following right TPJ 
stimulation but not left TPJ stimulation. Implicit agency was not affected in either stimulation condition. 
These findings are discussed in terms of the possible neural mechanisms of implicit and explicit sense of 
agency.  
 
 
 
Real and imagined walking by schizotypal individuals 
Naohide Yamamoto (1), Lucinda V. Rohde (2), Saliha Qadir (2), and Jennifer Van Pelt (1) 
1) Queensland University of Technology, 2) Cleveland State University 
naohide.yamamoto@qut.edu.au 
 
It has been postulated that efference copy constitutes an important cue for path integration, a component 
process of spatial navigation in which navigators derive their current location by integrating internally 
generated self-motion signals such as vestibular and proprioceptive cues. We sought for empirical support 
for this notion by capitalizing on the idea that dysfunctional efference copy may underlie schizotypal traits -
- that is, by examining whether low- and high-schizotypal individuals would perform path integration 
differently. In an experiment, participants with varying levels of schizotypal traits performed real and 
imagined walking tasks in which they either walked or imagined walking to a previewed target without vision 
and hearing. Real walking elicited vestibular and proprioceptive signals as well as efference copy, whereas 
imagined walking supposedly evoked efference copy only. Results showed a general tendency that high-
schizotypal participants carried out the tasks more slowly than low-schizotypal participants. In particular, 
imagined walking was reliably slower as participants' schizotypal traits became higher. These findings 
suggest that less functional efference copy in higher-schizotypal participants affected path integration in real 
and imagined walking, and its effect was more pronounced in imagined walking because this task was more 
critically dependent on efference copy. Together, they indicate the possibility that efference copy is indeed 
involved in human path integration. 
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The role of heads in body inversion effects in posture and identity discrimination tasks 
Emma L. Axelsson, Rachel A. Robbins and Tharindi Buddhadasa 
The Australian National University, Canberrra, Australia 
emma.l.axelsson@gmail.com 
 
Evidence for inversion effects with complete images of people, with bodies and heads, is typically reliable, 
but when it comes to headless bodies, there are contradictory findings. Studies of posture discrimination 
indicate that the inversion effect is absent with headless bodies (e.g., Yovel et al., 2010), suggesting that 
heads play a vital role in body representations. However, body identity discrimination studies demonstrate 
that headless bodies are also subject to an inversion effect (Robbins &amp; Coltheart, 2012) or even a 
reversed inversion effect with better discrimination of inverted compared to upright bodies (Minnebusch et 
al., 2009). To determine whether the difference is based on discriminating body postures compared to 
identities, a within groups design was employed where participants completed both task types in separate 
blocks.  Participants saw a sample image for 250 ms followed by the same image paired with either a 
contrasting posture or contrasting identity and participants indicated which image matched the sample. Half 
of the images were upright, half inverted, and half were headless and half whole figures (bodies with heads). 
Participants were more efficient in discriminating upright compared to inverted whole figures as well as 
headless bodies in both the posture and identity discrimination tasks. This suggests that bodies are subject 
to inversion effects without the presence of heads, regardless of task type. Study design (within and between 
groups) as well as eye-tracking data will also be discussed.  
 
 
 
Stimulus color has little effect on perception of visually induced circular vection 
DU Bo and Prof. Richard H.Y. So 
Department of Psychology, Nanyang Technological University; Department of Bioengineering, Hong Kong University of Science 
and Technology 
dubo@ntu.edu.sg 
 
Previous studies revealed that red dots could have effects on linear vection than the other colored dots in 
different experiments. Visual motion stimuli consist of red and black dots to induce circular vection (CV) have 
been frequently employed in vection studies. In the present study, visual motion stimuli consist of rotating 
dots were presented to 20 subjects, the effects of color (red and black dots; black dots; grey and black dots) 
and angular velocity (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 degree/second) on CV were investigated. The subject’s task was to 
press and hold one of two buttons whenever they felt vection. The two buttons corresponded to the 
subjective strength of vection: full-vection and partial-vection. Results indicated there was a significant effect 
of velocity, but no effect of the color on CV. The subjects perceived stronger CV (duration, frequency of CV 
occurrence and average duration) at 8 deg/sec, 16 deg/sec and 32 deg/sec than at the other velocities. The 
higher CV intensity occurred at 4 deg/sec and 8 deg/sec than at the other velocities. Moreover, the shortest 
CV onset latency was perceived at 64 deg/sec. These results could offer optimal choices of CV with respect 
to different requirements for CV strength, duration and susceptibility in psychophysical and neurological 
studies. The findings of color effect suggested that red component of visual motion stimuli might confound 
with other factors (e.g., stimulus luminance, luminance contrast and field of view) to influence CV.   
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Effects of body position and angular velocity on perception of visually-induced circular vection 
DU Bo and Richard H.Y. So 
Department of Psychology, Nanyang Technological University; Department of Bioengineering, Hong Kong University of Science 
and Technology 
dubo@ntu.edu.sg 
 
Visually induced circular vection (CV) has been the subject of many functional brain studies and behavioral 
studies. Unfortunately, participants in functional brain studies were in supine position while participants for 
behavioral studies were in upright positions. Consequently, their findings are confounded with viewing 
positions and there is no reported study comparing the effects of upright and supine positions on CV 
perception. This study examines the effects of viewing positions and their interactions with different angular 
velocity of the stimuli (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64 degree/second). 16 subjects were exposed twice to the stimuli that 
allowed varied body positions. Conditions were counterbalanced so that half of the subjects received the 
supine first and the other half received the upright condition first. Results indicated that CV with the longest 
accumulated and average duration occurred at 32 deg/sec for supine position. In addition, at slow velocities 
(2, 4 and 8 deg/sec), subjects perceived CV with longer accumulated and average duration when they were 
sitting in an upright position than lying in a supine position. Original data on accumulated and average CV 
duration under different velocities and body positions provide a vital link between findings of functional 
brain studies and behavioral studies. The findings that different CV are generated from supine and upright 
positions and gender difference need to be further explored in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Representing the location of manipulable objects in shape-selective occipitotemporal cortex: is there any 
evidence for spatiotopic reference frames? 
Marina Butko, Regine Zopf, Alexandra Woolgar, Mark A. Williams and Anina N. Rich 
Perception in Action Research Centre & Department of Cognitive Science, Faculty of Human Sciences, Macquarie University, 
Sydney, Australia; ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Macquarie University, Australia 
marina.butko@mq.edu.au 
 
When interacting with objects, we have to represent their location relative to our bodies. To facilitate bodily 
reactions, location may be encoded in the brain not just with respect to the retina (retinotopic reference 
frame), but also in relation to the head, trunk or arm (collectively spatiotopic reference frames). While 
spatiotopic reference frames can be found in brain areas for action planning, such as parietal areas, the 
existence of spatiotopic reference frames in higher-level occipitotemporal visual areas is debated. For 
example, Golomb and Kanwisher (2012) did not find evidence for spatiotopic reference frames in shape-
selective occipitotemporal cortex for faces, headless bodies and scenes stimuli. However, it may be possible 
that we tend to only represent body-centred location when viewing objects that are typically manipulated. 
Here, we used fMRI multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) and Bayesian analyses to test if location can be 
encoded in a spatiotopic reference frame in shape-selective occipitotemporal cortex when using 
manipulable object stimuli (balls and cups). We found strong evidence for retinotopic location encoding 
further supporting previous findings that retinotopic reference frames are common neural representations 
of object location. In contrast, when testing for spatiotopic encoding that is independent of retinotopic 
encoding, we found conclusive evidence that objective location information for small manipulable objects is 
not decodable in relation to the body in shape-selective occipitotemporal cortex. Interestingly, further 
exploratory analyses suggest that spatiotopic location might modulate retinotopic location encoding, which 
may be why spatiotopic encoding has been difficult to find in other analyses. 
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Judgements of object width and grasp configuration 
Annie A. Butler, Martin E. Héroux, Tess van Eijk and Simon C. Gandevia 
Neuroscience Research Australia and the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia 
a.butler@neura.edu.au 
 
When grasping objects, we are able to perceive the aperture of our hand (the distance between our thumb 
and fingers), even without vision.  However, this perception is not stable. For example, it can be influenced 
by a change in the weight of the object (1).  We investigated how grasp configuration and subjects’ 
attentional focus influence this perception. Without vision, 20 subjects grasped a 6.5 cm-stationary object 
with two grasp configurations; thumb with all fingers, and thumb with index finger.  For both configurations, 
subjects were asked to attend to and report perceived grasp aperture or perceived object width using a 
visual chart.  Additional objects of 5.5 cm and 7.5 cm were included as distractors.  Overall, subjects 
underestimated object width and grasp aperture by 0.42 cm [95% CI 0.18, 0.67].  Across the two grasp 
configurations, there was a 0.38 cm [0.28, 0.47] difference in perception (thumb with all fingers: 6.27 cm 
[6.16, 6.38]; thumb with index finger: 5.89 cm [5.78, 6.00]). In contrast, there was no effect of attention 
(grasp aperture: 6.10 cm [5.98, 6.21]; object width: 6.06 cm [5.95, 6.16]).  Thus, perception of the hand and 
object is closer to reality when grasping an object with all digits.  Furthermore, judgements of hand 
configuration and object size may access the same perceptual ruler.  
1. Butler AA, Héroux ME, Gandevia SC (2015). PLoS One. 10:e0127983. 
 
 
 
 
 
Biological motion and belief-of-agency information elicit similar patterns of inhibition of return 
Chandler-Mather, N. (2), Welsh, T. (2) and Kritikos, A. (1) 
1) School of Psychology, The University of Queensland; 2) Faculty of Kinesiology and Physical Education, The University of Toronto 
n.chandlermather@uq.edu.au 
 
Inhibition of return (IOR) refers to slowed to responses to targets presented at previously-attended 
locations. Response times are also slowed to targets that a co-actor has previously responded to (social IOR; 
sIOR). It is unclear what information from the social context is contributing to sIOR. We tested whether 
biological motion and belief-of-agency generate sIOR. Participants lifted their fingers from midsagittal 
starting position and touched a green target positioned on the right or left bottom edge of a monitor. Targets 
were cued congruently or incongruently by a white dot. There were four dot motion conditions: the dot 
followed the biological motion of someone pointing (biol-upright), the same motion but played upside down 
(biol-inverted), a non-biological motion (linear), and linear motion with the belief that it represents a 
pointing action of a female model. The SOA between the initiation of the dot’s movement and the 
presentation of the target was 200ms, 600ms, and 1300ms. Similar patterns of inhibition were observed 
following biological motion and linear motion with belief-of-agency at SOAs of 600ms and 1300ms. We 
speculate that the visuomotor system activates motor plans based on visual kinematic information and 
beliefs about the origin of the stimulus. This capacity may underpin IOR in social interactions.   
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Role of action planning in suppression of auditory evoked potentials 
Miranda Chilver and Dr Oren Griffiths 
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia 
miranda.chilver@gmail.com 
 
It is well known that the brain processes self-produced stimuli differently from externally produced stimuli. 
This difference is observed in auditory event-related potentials (ERPs) which measure brain activity in 
response to sounds. Sounds produced by participants pressing a button elicit smaller N1 and P2 ERP peaks 
than the same sounds passively listened to. N1 and P2 suppression is believed to be caused by corollary 
discharge, a mechanism allowing the brain to predict and prepare for self-produced stimuli. Action planning 
is required before corollary discharge is able to occur. However, it is unclear whether N1 and P2 effects also 
depend on action planning. Thus, this experiment tested whether external button presses initiated through 
electrical and physical manipulations can cause N1 and P2 suppression. Furthermore, we tested whether 
using the same manipulations on oneself to produce indirect presses would result in ERPs more similar to 
direct (no manipulations), or external actions. We found N1 and P2 suppression for direct, but not external 
or electrically-induced indirect actions. Interestingly, N1 and P2 suppression effects differed for physically-
induced indirect actions, such that suppression was found at P2, but not N1. My talk will discuss these 
findings in relation to the role of action planning in N1 and P2 suppression, and consider the implications for 
interpreting N1 and P2 effects. 
 
 
 
 
Presence and Absence in Seeing: A Case study of Schrödinger's kittens and Motion Induce Blindness  
Tommy Cleary 
University of Notre Dame Australia 
tomcleary@live.com.au 
 
Here the established illusion of Motion Induced Blindness (MIB) is presented as a way of investigation the 
precarious phenomenology of presence and absence in vision. This paper will investigate this precariousness 
with the aid of kittens. These are Schrödinger’s MIB kittens. Like the cat in Schrödinger’s thought experiment 
which involved investigation of the way a cat could be ambiguously understood to be alive or dead 
depending on the particular way a nearby radioactive isotope happened to behave, so too these kittens are 
either visible or invisible depending on the way the peripheral vision of the observer behaves. That is, the 
kittens has been put at risk of disappearing by simply being in the peripheral vision which, while the eyes are 
stationary, is a dangerous place to be. Moving blue dots make their disappearance more likely in an illusion 
know as Motion Induced Blindness (MIB). Where the cat goes is difficult to know, but like most cats it comes 
back when it feels like it. This illusion and exploration of presence and absence in vision is important to 
understanding the precarious nature of the experience of seeing. This is particularly important to understand 
when working with people with low or limited vision. The experiences of seeing reported when vision 
restoration is attempted with the aid of prototype bionic devices also has a precarious quality. 
Understanding the precarious nature of presence and absence in vision as ubiquitous to all seeing, can be 
used as a way to help describe the phenomenology of bionic vision restoration. 
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Allostatic regulation and the conditions of biological agency 
Andrew W Corcoran and Jakob Hohwy 
Cognition & Philosophy Lab, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia 
andrew.corcoran1@monash.edu 
 
Traditional accounts of interoceptive processing suggest that the neural representation of bodily states 
serves to provide the brain with the necessary information for maintaining homeostasis. More recently, 
evidence implicating embodied sensory experience as a key constituent of various higher-level cognitive 
processes or phenomena, including emotion, selfhood, and conscious awareness, has begun to accrue. In 
light of these developments, we argue that the supposedly fundamental role interoception plays in signaling 
the current physiological status of the internal milieu ought to be revised in favour of a more nuanced 
understanding of biological regulation. On this account, interoceptive information from the viscera and 
perceptual data from the external environment are integrated in the context of the agent’s prior experience. 
The dynamic unfolding of internal and external sensory events over time precipitates the emergence of 
sophisticated, anticipatory modes of physiological regulation (‘allostasis’). To date, most investigators have 
sought to understand how such allostatic control processes might contribute to the overall health and 
wellbeing of the individual, and how the dysfunction of such mechanisms might give rise to a range of 
physical and mental disorders (e.g., cardiovascular disease, anxiety, depression). We argue however that a 
deeper analysis of allostatic regulation discloses insights that help us to understand fundamental aspects of 
adaptive biological agency across multiple scales of spatiotemporal complexity. 
 
 
 
 
The Mirror Rubber Hand Illusion: Blurring the Sense of Self 
Jhana de Silva (1), Martin Davies (2) and Anne Aimola Davies (1, 2) 
1) Research School of Psychology, Australian National University; 2) Department of Experimental Psychology and Faculty of 
Philosophy, University of Oxford 
jhana.desilva@anu.edu.au 
 
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm has been used to explore body ownership, demonstrating that 
participants may misattribute a touch they feel on their own hand to a rubber hand that they see in front of 
them. This occurs when the rubber hand is stroked synchronously with the participant’s hidden hand. 
Mirrors have been used to explore many aspects of self-awareness, such as, theory of mind, body schema 
and motor agency, but there has been limited research into how mirrors influence body ownership in the 
RHI. In the current study, the RHI paradigm was used in the traditional method without a mirror, and also 
with a mirror placed in the sagittal plane. We tested participants with Vision Touch Synaesthesia (VTS), who 
are particularly susceptible to body ownership illusions, and control participants, using three stroking 
conditions -- synchronous, asynchronous, and no-touch (i.e., the rubber hand was stroked but the 
participant’s hand was not). In everyday encounters, individuals with VTS describe feeling touch when they 
observe others being touched, which is the reason we included a no-touch RHI condition. We found that, 
compared to the no-mirror condition, a mirror in the sagittal plane attenuated the RHI in the synchronous 
condition for both participant groups, and also in the no-touch and asynchronous conditions for VTS 
participants. These findings demonstrate that a sagittal mirror can significantly decrease the strength of body 
ownership illusions. Our preliminary research indicates that sagittal mirrors emphasise visual capture of 
proprioception, which may conflict with the illusory properties of the RHI.  
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How does attention affect perceived finger location and ownership in a grasp illusion? 
Lucy Fletcher, Annie Butler, Audrey Wang, Simon Gandevia and Martin Heroux 
Neuroscience Research Australia, Australian Catholic University 
lucy.fletcher@myacu.edu.au 
 
Passively grasping an unseen artificial finger causes the index fingers to feel ~5 cm closer (from 12 cm) and 
induces a sense of ownership over the finger (Héroux et al. 2013, J Physiol).  This study determines how 
attention influences this grasp illusion. In 30 naïve subjects, the effect of attentional focus was investigated 
under three conditions: (1) auditory-guided cueing to increase upper extremity awareness, (2) touch-guided 
cueing to increase upper extremity awareness, and (3) watching a silent film (control).  Each condition lasted 
3 min, followed by measures of perceived index finger spacing and perceived ownership of the artificial 
finger (7-point Likert scale). Interoceptive awareness was measured by heartbeat tracking and an 
interoception questionnaire. Compared to control, auditory- and touch-guided cueing did not influence 
index finger spacing or perceived ownership. However, after adjusting for interoceptive awareness, the 
auditory-guided cueing caused the index fingers to feel an additional 1.3 cm closer [0.1 to 2.6] (mean [95% 
CI]) and perceived ownership to increase by 3.3 points [2.6 to 3.9]. The regression model retained heartbeat 
tracking performance for measures of perceived spacing, and questionnaire scores for perceived ownership. 
Thus, stronger grasp illusions were experienced by individuals with lower interoceptive awareness. Overall, 
attention modulates the strength of the grasp illusion when individual differences in interoceptive 
awareness are considered. Future studies of body representation should take into account the effect of 
interoceptive awareness on perceived body location and ownership. 
 
 
 
Sense of Agency Confidence and Body Image Perception: Evidence from The Alien Hand Experiment 
Thiago Gomes de Castro, Marcelle Matiazo Pinhatti and William Barbosa Gomes 
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil 
thiago.cast@gmail.com 
 
Body image perception comprises stable and dynamic representational features. Recent literature in the 
field has investigated whether whole body representational features predict sense of agency and perception 
of movement.  Here, we examined whether a stable body image measure correlates to a sense of agency 
score extracted from an experimental task. Moreover, we tested whether differential body image perception 
scores predicted sense of agency performance under sensory conflict conditions. A total of 21 non clinical 
university students (age M=25.9, SD=9.29) completed the Brazilian version of the Silhouette Figures Scale 
and participated in The Alien Hand Experiment. The experiment comprises a task that manipulates 
participants’ sense of agency by means of a conflict between visual arm movement input and proprioceptive 
arm movement input. We tested three experimental conditions: (a) control condition - seeing own real arm 
movement, (b) convergent condition - seeing alien arm movement mimicking own real arm movement, and 
(c) divergent condition - seeing alien arm movement deviating from own movement trajectory. A Bayesian 
correlation matrix revealed substantial negative correlation probability between body image distortion and 
sense of agency confidence in accuracy responses, specifically in experimental conditions where agency was 
manipulated. Based on the Silhouette Figures Scale scores, participants were divided into groups with (n=12) 
and without (n=9) evidences of body image distortion. Bayesian Independent Samples T-Tests evidenced 
substantial differential probability between groups. Analyzes confirmed lower sense of agency confidence 
among subjects with body image distortion greater than ±3 kg/m². No differences between groups were 
observed regarding sense of agency accuracy.  
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Boundary Exploration in Enactivist Artificial Agents 
Rafik Hadfi and Jakob Hohwy 
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia 
rafik.hadfi@monash.edu 
 
Enactivism has established itself as an alternative to the computationalist-representationalist paradigm 
largely used in modelling and developing artificial agents. Enactive cognition does not rely on computational 
processing and instead emphasises the dynamics of agent-environment sensorimotor coupling. Enactivist 
principles provide a research agenda that ranges from the most basic forms of behaviour to the highest end 
of human consciousness. Such principles displace the explanatory focus from internal representations to 
direct sensorimotor interaction. This shift of focus, I argue, should also occur in the development of artificial 
agents that could learn to interact with people in a manner that is consistent with the human body and social 
psychology. This development would have applications in areas like robot-assisted healthcare or in treating 
people with developmental disabilities. 
The present paper proposes an agent framework where agency is defined on the basis of the regularities of 
interactions within an abstract environment. I particularly develop artificial agents that explore, learn, and 
exploit regularities in their milieu. Such interactionally motivated agents follow decision mechanisms that 
rely on the agent's capacity of anticipation to choose interactions that have positive valence and avoid 
interactions that have negative valence. Using the same enactivist paradigm, I characterise the functional 
boundaries of the agent and examine if the status of its internal subsystems could predict spacial regularities 
on the frontiers of its external milieu. Identifying the processes that give rise to such boundary would refine 
our understanding of the emergence of the self in simulated environments. 
 
 
 
Baseline perceived size of the arm, hands, palm, and full body in healthy adults  
Laurence R. Harris and Sarah D’Amour 
York University 
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The perception of body size has traditionally been studied using subjective, qualitative measures that assess 
only one type of body representation - the conscious body image. Previous research has typically focused on 
measuring the perceived size of the entire body rather than individual body parts, such as the arms and the 
hands. Here, we used a novel psychophysical method for determining perceived body size that taps into the 
implicit body representation. Using a two-alternative forced choice design, participants were sequentially 
shown two life-size images of either their arm, hand, palm, or full body. In one interval either the horizontal 
or vertical dimension of the image was varied using an adaptive staircase, while the other interval contained 
the full-size, undistorted image. Participants reported which image most closely matched their perceived 
size. The staircase honed in on the distorted image that was equally likely to be judged as matching their 
perception as the accurate image from which the perceived size was calculated. The orientation of the image 
was varied to compare performance for familiar and unfamiliar views. The Body Shape Questionnaire 
(Cooper et al., 1986) was administered in order to determine if body dissatisfaction affected perceived size 
accuracy. Participants were not accurate at judging their size, and differences occurred depending on the 
viewpoint. These results provide psychophysically robust baseline measurements of how accurately healthy 
participants perceive the size of their body and body parts, revealing distortions of the implicit body 
representation independent of the conscious body image. 
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Time, touch and temperature affect perceived finger position and ownership in the grasp illusion 
Martin E Héroux , Nicolas Bayle , Annie A Butler and Simon C Gandevia  
Neuroscience Research Australia and the University of New South Wales 
m.heroux@neura.edu.au 
 
Perceived body position and ownership are fundamental to our ability to sense and interact with the world. 
Previous work indicates that dynamic multisensory stimuli are needed to alter the sense of body ownership. 
In the present study 30 subjects passively grasped an artificial rubber finger with their left index and thumb 
while their right index finger, located 12 cm below, was lightly clamped. Fingers with varied physical 
characteristics were also passively grasped to determine how these characteristics influenced perceived 
body position and ownership. Subjects immediately felt their hands to be 5.3 cm [3.4 to 7.3] (mean [95%CI]) 
closer, a feeling that remained after 3 min (6.0 cm [4.5 to 7.5]). By the end of the trial, perceived ownership 
increased by 1.2 [0.6 to 1.9] points on a 7-point Likert scale, with the group average moving from 'neither 
agree or disagree' at the start to 'somewhat agree' at the end. Compared to grasping a control rubber finger, 
grasping a cold, rough, oddly shaped or rectangular shaped finger-like object reduced perceived ownership. 
These results provide new insights into the role of cutaneous sensory receptors in defining these aspects of 
proprioception, and the speed with which these effects occur. Touch rapidly induces large, sustained 
changes in perceived body position and prolonged exposure to these cutaneous inputs, alone, can induce a 
sense of body ownership. Also, certain physical characteristics of grasped objects influence the sense of body 
ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
When the body is the target - the role of body representations in non-accidental self-injury: A systematic 
review 
Emily Hielscher (1,2,3), Thomas Whitford (4), James G. Scott (1,2,5) and Regine Zopf (6) 
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Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia; 4) School of Psychology, UNSW Australia, Sydney, NSW, Australia; 5) Metro North Mental 
Health, Royal Brisbane and Women's Hospital, Herston, QLD, Australia; 6) Perception in Action Research Centre & Department of 
Cognitive Science, Faculty of Human Sciences, Macquarie University & ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, 
Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia  
e.hielscher@uq.edu.au 
 
Background: Typically, we try to protect our own bodies and this is supported by internal representations 
that specify one’s body identity and location. But in self-harm, the body becomes the target. One possibility 
is that body representation disturbances contribute to self-harming behaviour. During adolescence, the 
body becomes more salient to one’s self-concept, and it is also the age at which first acts of self-harm are 
typically reported. Thus, the link between body representation disturbances and self-harm could be 
especially prominent in adolescence.  
Methods: We conducted a systematic review to critically examine the potential role of body representation 
disturbances in non-accidental self-injury (with/without suicidal intent) in adolescents and young adults (12-
25 years). Several international databases (PubMed, PsycINFO, EMBASE, Social Science Database, Web of 
Science) were searched, and then the literature was reviewed via a narrative synthesis of the data. 
Results: The search strategy identified 64 studies reporting on 275,183 participants from 20 countries. 
Overall, participants reporting non-accidental self-injury reported greater levels of body dissatisfaction, body 
disownership, somatic complaints, and interoceptive deficits compared to non-injuring control groups; 
however, there was subscale variability, gender and race differences. The quality of evidence was highest 
for body image studies and lowest for body ownership studies, with small samples and no adjustment for 
confounders. 
Conclusion: There was consistent evidence of disturbances across several different body representations 
(image, ownership, sensations) in adolescents and young adults who engage in non-accidental self-injury. 
This points to a need for investigating self-harm therapies that take body image and awareness into account. 
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The selfless self 
Ines Hipolito 
University of Wollongong, Australia 
hipolito.ines@gmail.com 
 
There are two fundamental models to understand the self, one is the neurobiology of consciousness and the 
other is the phenomenological approach. In Damasio’s neurobiology, consciousness is enabled by the result 
of a procession of neural maps of inner and outer worlds, that is what he names, self-consciousness. Without 
a self the mind would lose its orientation, thoughts would be freewheeling, unclaimed by an owner, and we 
would certainly look unconscious (Damasio, 2010, chap. III). Damasio makes a distinction between three 
levels of “self”. I will attempt to show this theory is mostly centred on the notion and levels of self as 
archetyped by the brain. While Damasio rejects dualism by bringing consciousness back to the body (brain 
function), he is also rejecting phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and bringing the discussion back to a 
physicalist view of the self. Can the self be thought in a non-reductive model? I will make the case for the 
notion of a self as process, as it is thought in the enactive approach.  Finally, I will conclude that the self in 
these terms ca be accommodated by a non-cognitivist view of the free energy principle, which implies that 
mentality is nearly everywhere. I expect being able to make the case for the enlightening role of a strong 
continuity view on particular concepts of life (autopoiesis and adaptivity) and mind (basic and non-semantic), 
that enable the process of a selfless self. 
 
 
 
 
Measuring the Sense of Self in Brain-damaged Patients 
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Researchers have recently focused on the embodied sense of self (ESS), which consists of the minimal and 
narrative self. Although a study demonstrated that the ESS is related to brain dysfunction empirically, the 
subjective aspects of the ESS and a systematic approach to it have not yet been examined in brain-damaged 
patients. To examine this issue, we measured the ESS of patients with brain tumors before and after awake 
craniotomy. A self-reported questionnaire called the Embodied Sense of Self Scale (ESSS) was used to 
measure the ESS in patients with brain tumors before and after surgery. For comparison, age-matched 
controls also completed the ESSS. The ESSS scores of the patients with brain tumors before surgery were 
higher than those of the controls and improved after surgery. Sensory deficits induced deteriorated agency. 
Episodic memory disturbance was highly correlated with malfunction of narrative self and ownership. Brain 
lesions caused an anomalous ESS, which was related to the patient’s cognitive and physical dysfunction. 
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Relationship between agency judgment and intentional binding 
Shu Imaizumi and Yoshihiko Tanno 
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Sense of agency stems from the action-effect congruency based on internal prediction. Explicit measure of 
sense of agency includes self-report judgment. Implicit measure of agency includes the degree of intentional 
binding, in which the temporal action-effect interval is perceived as shorter than the actual interval. We 
examined whether agency judgment and intentional binding correlate while being modulated by the action-
effect temporal congruency. Participants performed voluntary keypresses that triggered a tone after 
variable delays (100-900 ms). Subsequently, participants rated their agency over the tone using a 9-point 
scale and estimated the keypress-tone interval. The agency rating and the degree of intentional binding 
decreased with increasing tone delays. Importantly, there was a moderately positive correlation between 
the slopes of linear regression for agency rating and intentional binding with the tone delay as an 
independent variable, indicating that agency rating and intentional binding were modulated by action-effect 
temporal congruency in a similar manner. These results suggest that the explicit and implicit sense of agency 
moderately correlate and are commonly based on temporal prediction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mutual responsiveness in action and embodied cognition  
Felipe León 
University of Copenhagen, Denmark  
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According to a leading philosophical account of small-scale cooperative joint action (Bratman 1999, 2014: 
78), central instances of it require from participants to be mutually responsive in action to one another, i.e. 
they demand the flexible tracking and adjustment of an agent’s actions to the actions of co-agents during 
joint action execution. This leading account has been criticized for not being informative about the “body 
glue” required by mutual responsiveness in action (Pacherie 2015, 24). Therefore, it has been suggested that 
more attention should be given to some cognitive mechanisms that plausibly enable joint action execution, 
such as co-representation of tasks, co-representation of perceptions, and alignment mechanisms (Pacherie 
2015, Knoblich et al. 2011, Gallotti et al. 2017). The aim of my presentation is to map out and examine some 
theoretical perspectives for researching how bodily information concerning a co-agent may be integrated by 
an agent in the context of activities involving mutual responsiveness in action. Following the proposal that 
joint action execution is supported by a “shared action space” (Pezzulo et al. 2013), I examine some ways of 
framing the interpersonal integration of bodily information that differ because of their commitment to 
different understandings of what embodied cognition amounts to: ‘weak’, functionalist, biological or 
enactive embodied cognition (see Gallagher 2017, Ch. 2). 
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Loudness judgements are not necessarily affected by visual cues to sound source distance 
Sol Libesman, Thomas Whitford and Damien Mannion 
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The intensity of the auditory signals at the ear depends both on the intrinsic capacity of the emitter to 
produce sound and on the distance of the emitter from the listener. Loudness constancy requires that our 
perceptual experience of intensity, loudness, corresponds to the source intensity by remaining invariant to 
the confounding effects of distance. In this experiment using a healthy university population, we tested the 
hypothesis that visual cues to sound source distance are capable of supporting a degree of loudness 
constancy when the auditory stimulus does not contain environmental cues. We presented human 
participants with a simulated visual environment, on a computer monitor, which contained a visible 
loudspeaker at a particular distance and was accompanied by the auditory delivery, via headphones, of 
anechoic sounds (pure tones, pink noise bursts, and speech utterances) of a particular aural intensity. We 
measured the point of subjective loudness equality for sounds associated with loudspeakers at different 
visually depicted distances. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found such loudness judgments to be closely 
aligned with the aural intensity rather than being affected by the apparent distance of the sound source. We 
conclude that the loudness of anechoic sounds are not necessarily affected by indications of the sound 
source distance as established via the visual-modality. In the future, if clinical conditions associated with 
deficits in self-suppression, also demonstrate deficits in their ability to discount the affect of an emitters’ 
distance on auditory intensity, this may have implications for how we interpret these differences in 
amplitude responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Role of Social Engagement during Interpersonal Coordination: Sensorimotor Synchronisation with an 
Adaptive Rhythmic Robot 
Peta Mills, Christopher Stanton, Trevor Mcpherson and Peter Keller 
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The ability to coordinate movement between multiple actors is important in many domains of human life, 
but the role of social factors (e.g. partner agency or how interactive the partner is) are not fully understood. 
We used an adaptive drumming Nao robot that modulated the timing of its drum strokes in response to 
participants’ drum timing to investigate synchronisation with an interactive social partner versus a static 
non-interactive partner. Participants (n = 33) drummed with either ‘SocialBot’, a robot that used speech and 
eye gaze to interact with participants, or ‘MetroBot’ a non-interactive robot that remained static except for 
the drumming movement. Both conditions included three levels of robot drumming adaptivity, from 
minimally to moderately adaptive. Results firstly indicated that overall human-robot synchronization was 
more accurate when the robot was more adaptive. Secondly, while SocialBot was rated more 
anthropomorphic, animate, and likeable, there were differences in participant’s perceptions of which robot 
was easier to synchronise with (despite identical objective difficulty across conditions). Interestingly, 
participants who rated MetroBot as easier to synchronise with were more accurate than those who found it 
easier with SocialBot or those who found the conditions equally difficult. Individuals who were better at the 
task thus found it easier to synchronise with the less interactive robot. Furthermore, participants who did 
not perceive any difference in difficulty between the two interactivity conditions synchronised more 
accurately with SocialBot. These findings suggest that individual differences in personality or partner 
preferences may interact with external social factors during interpersonal coordination.  
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Temporality: the predictive landscape of selfhood 
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The concept of “time” has been given numerous treatments by various thinkers, including St. Augustine, 
William James, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Francisco Varela. Most conceptions of 
temporality view it as a moving stream observed through an individual’s window of experience, with debate 
over the demarcations between versions of past, present, and future. I argue that temporality may be more 
precisely viewed as a unitary ‘pre-spatial’ field in which the sense of self is dissolved and reconstructed; time 
does not move, only self does. The perceived continuity of time (subjectively) is a symptom of the recursive 
(re)construction of self, or “selfing”, that produces a perceived continuity of self, ‘over time’. A static self-
sense allows for an agent to exert greater overall lifetime prediction error minimization and thus maximise 
survival. A simple way for consciousness to deal with a fluid constructional process (selfing) is to construct a 
model that (1) indexes the projected spaces of memory and potentiality as coordinates along a linear 
dimension and (2) construes a static self-sense that traverses it subjectively. This results in the sense that 
there is a dimension of time along which one can “move” (projecting into past or future space), wherein 
each “move” is the enactment of a space by calling coordinates from a modelled index. This account offers 
an initial attempt at addressing the ontology and phenomenology of subjective temporality in a way that is 
commensurate with a predictive coding view of selfhood, with implications for research in philosophy and 
cognitive neuroscience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Modelling me, modelling you: The Autistic Self 
Kelsey Palghat and Jakob Hohwy 
Cognition and Philosophy Lab, Philosophy Department, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia 
kelsey.palghat@monash.edu 
 
The stereotype of Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC or “autism”) focuses on the social and communicative 
elements of the diagnostic criteria. In this review, we step back from autism as a social and communicative 
disorder and focus on the autistic self. The autistic self is a key component of the condition which has 
nevertheless received comparatively little attention. We provide a taxonomy for experimental paradigms in 
the cognitive sciences that aim to address questions related to the self in the areas of action, memory, 
attention, recognition, body-representation, awareness of internal states, language and self-knowledge. We 
critically evaluate their relationships to philosophical conceptions of the self including Bayesian accounts, 
narrative, minimal and embodied selves. Further, we articulate reasons why the self might differ in ASC 
drawing from the empirical evidence presented. We emphasize the possible impact of a predictive 
processing account of autism on conceptualizing the autistic self, with a focus on context sensitivity, model 
complexity, learning, integration, active inference and precision. This opens up large scope for future 
research on unique differences in the autistic self, which is intended to be extended as a framework for 
understanding the condition as a whole in a new and unified way.  
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Can we afford a new approach to the virtual memory palace? 
Anco Peeters and Miguel Segundo-Ortin 
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Even though the memory palace technique has been around for millennia and has proven to be a powerful 
way of remembering, it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently unable to explain why it 
works so well. Second, the technique faces significant practical challenges to its users: they need to have 
access to a suitable training environment and have lots of time in order to practice the technique. Virtual 
reality devices are sometimes presented as a way to face these practical challenges, but currently fall short 
of delivering on that promise. We aim to address both issues in this talk. First, we argue that an enactive-
ecological approach to memory can help us understand the effectiveness of memory palaces as an embodied 
technique. Second, we present design recommendations from an enactive-ecological perspective for those 
virtual reality devices that aim to support the memory palace technique -- our prediction is that this will help 
the effectiveness of such devices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dancing bodies, shaped minds: an ecological approach to expert stage presence 
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In Western culture, the concept of presence holds a cluster of different connotations. Theatrical and 
performance studies have generally focused either on the intrinsic ability of the actor to capture the 
audience’s attention, or on the mutual relationship with the audience, which Zarrilli (2012) refers as the 
ground for the emergence of presence as experience.  
Is presence then a state that our minds can regularly experience, or is it a special condition that can be 
accessed only under very particular circumstances? What is the role played by a larger ecology that includes 
other performers on stage, different technologies and unusual environments, in shaping the experience and 
perception of presence? We investigate presence’s variations by tackling the phenomenon of stage 
presence. We are developing a cognitive ethnography (Hutchins 1995) that addresses questions of embodied 
cognition in three different dance forms: Contemporary Ballet, in the case of the National Ballet of Marseille 
and the staging of the piece 'Passione'; Contact Improvisation, a duet-system based practice, aimed at 
fostering interkinaesthetic awareness and challenging habits of movement; and BodyWeather, a dance 
training originating from Butoh, significant for its relationship with nature (Fraleigh 1999). By adopting a 
phenomenological approach, which requires a direct engagement with the different dance trainings and 
contexts of practice analysed, we tackle the diversity of the cognitive ecologies in which stage presence is 
understood and performed, addressing the variations in which embodied skills are enacted, and emphasizes 
how different aesthetics and cultural factors shape habits, social cognition and perception of self.  
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Modulating sensory responses with hypnotic manipulations of the sense of agency. 
Vince Polito 
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Highly hypnotisable people often describe their actions during hypnosis as occurring without effort. Similar 
shifts in the sense of personal agency are described in clinical conditions such as alien control delusions and 
in certain symptoms of schizophrenia, such as passivity phenomena. I am interested in exploring the 
mechanisms which lead to these agency alterations. As a way of better understanding the features and 
processes involved, I have been using hypnosis to create analogues of clinical agency disruptions in the lab. 
Experiments with hypnotic analogues involve suggestions for highly hypnotisable participants to experience 
an altered sense of control over their body or actions.  
In a study investigating tickle responses highly hypnotisable participants were given a hypnotic suggestion 
to experience alien control over the movements of their hand and arm. Following this suggestion they 
exhibited significantly increased response to their self-generated tickle movements. Based on these findings, 
I will highlight the features of agency disruption common to hypnosis and clinical cases and discuss the 
implications for theories of agency and hypnosis. 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal Grasp Illusion: Effect of Distance and Limb Crossing on Perceived Hand Spacing and Ownership 
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Our recent study found that hands, which are 12 cm apart vertically, are perceived much closer together 
when passively grasping an unseen artificial finger-like object. Also, participants report some ownership over 
the ‘rubber finger’ (1). The present study aimed to investigate this grasp illusion in the horizontal plane. 
Thirty healthy participants were tested in two conditions (grasp and no grasp). Their right index finger was 
positioned in the midline of the body. Participants grasped the rubber finger passively with their left thumb 
and index, with the rubber finger in one of four locations (15 or 24 cm on either side of midline). Hands were 
perceived 3.2 cm [0.7 to 5.7] (mean [95% CI]) closer together during the grasp condition compared to no 
grasp condition when the left hand was 15 cm across the midline. For this trial, a separate measure found 
that the left hand was perceived 2.0 cm [0.6 to 3.4] closer to the right hand, while the right hand was 
perceived 0.4 cm [-0.6 to 1.4] closer to the left hand. Perceived ownership (rated on a 7-point Likert scale) 
was between ‘Disagree’ to ‘Somewhat Disagree’ for all hand locations. With the hands apart horizontally, 
grasping a rubber finger reduces perceived spacing only when the hands are moderately crossed. Contrary 
to when the hands are apart vertically, the illusory coming together of the hands in the horizontal plane is 
not associated with an increased sense of ownership.  
Héroux, Walsh, Butler & Gandevia (2013). J Physiol 591, 5661–5670. 
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Predictive agents, precision-weighting, and modelling the body 
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Hohwy (2017; 2016) has recently defended an account of active inference (henceforth AI) on which the 
embodied agent continually acts on “massive hierarchical representations of the world external to the brain 
and its sensory organs” (2016, p. 19). AI, so contends Hohwy, supports a picture of the mind as “more 
neurocentrically skull-bound than embodied or externded” (ibid. 1). Hohwy appeals to Friston’s work on 
Markov blankets in order to characterise cognitive processing in relation to a form of Bayesian inference, 
executed with multi-level, richly structured representations. On this vision, successful action is seen as 
providing evidence for the existence of the agent, understood as a model of the world (ibid.) Recently, Clark 
has criticised this highly inferentialist rendition of AI, claiming that the criteria Hohwy employs in 
characterising cognitive processing are absurd, since they seem to preclude even the brain from functioning 
as a cognitive resource (2016 p. 12). In this presentation, I show that Clark’s attempted reductio is 
unsuccessful, and that he crucially misunderstands how Hohwy appeals to Markov blankets in delineating 
cognitive processing. In closing, however, I criticise Hohwy’s highly inferentialist interpretation of AI. Drawing 
appeal to literature on Bayesian and post-Bayesian perceptual models, I argue that Hohwy’s claim that AI 
does not sit well with certain embodied views rests on an understanding of (precision-weighting) attentional 
processes that might well commit him to precisely the kind of ‘overly-intellectualised’ picture of cognitive 
processing and mental representations that he looks to distance his predictive story from.  
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Mentally imagining another’s perspective is a high-level social process, reliant on manipulating internal 
representations of the self in an embodied manner. Recently Wang et al., (1) showed that theta-band (3-
7Hz) brain oscillations within the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) and brain regions coding for 
motor/body schema contribute to the process of perspective-taking. Using a task requiring participants to 
engage in embodied perspective-taking, we set out to unravel the extended functional brain network and 
its connections in detail. We found that increasing the angle of disparity between self and other perspective 
was accompanied by greater reaction times and increases in theta power within rTPJ, right lateral pre-frontal 
cortex (PFC) and right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Using nonparametric Granger-causality, we showed 
that during later stages of perspective-taking, the lateral PFC and ACC exert top-down influences over rTPJ, 
indicative of executive control processes required for managing conflicts between self and other 
perspectives. Finally, we quantified patterns of whole-brain phase coupling (imaginary coherence) in relation 
to rTPJ during high-level perspective taking. Results suggest that rTPJ increases its theta-band phase 
synchrony with brain regions involved in mentalizing and regions coding for motor/body schema; whilst 
decreasing its synchrony to visual regions. Implications for neurocognitive models are discussed, and it is 
proposed that rTPJ acts as a ‘hub’ to route bottom-up visual information to internal representations of the 
self during perspective-taking, co-ordinated by theta-band oscillations. The self is then projected onto the 
other’s perspective via embodied motor/body schema transformations, regulated by top-down cingulo-
frontal activity. 
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Object attention mediates the relationship between body dissatisfaction and susceptibility to the body 
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Body size and shape misperception (BSSM) is common in people with eating disorders. Exposure to thin 
idealised bodies in the media, or obese bodies in economically deprived neighbourhoods have been 
associated with BSSM. Recently, studies have shown that exposure to extreme body stimuli results in a shift 
in the point of subjective normality, suggesting that visual adaptation may be a mechanism by which visual 
norms are determined in everyday life. Yet, within a given geographical area, some individuals will develop 
BSSM and others will not. The reason for these individual difference is currently unknown. While attention 
has been shown to enhance adaptation effects in low (e.g. rotational and linear motion) and high level stimuli 
(e.g., facial gender), women with greater body dissatisfaction (BD) have been found to pay more attention 
to images of thin bodies. Here, we test the hypothesis that there is an indirect effect of BD on the direction 
and magnitude of the body fat adaptation effect, mediated via object attention (i.e., selectively attending to 
images of thin over fat bodies or vice versa). Significant mediation effects were found in both men and 
women, suggesting that observers’ level of BD may influence selective attention to thin or fat bodies, which 
in turn influences the magnitude and direction of body fat adaptation.  
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Action observation modulates corticomotor excitability. Such modulation has been understood to be the 
result of a simulation of the observed action. Alternatively or complementary to this perspective, growing 
evidence in behavioral research shows that changes in motor activity during observation of rhythmic 
movements can occur via direct visuomotor couplings and dynamical entrainment. In-phase and anti-phase 
entrainment spontaneously occur, characterized by movements proceeding simultaneously in the same or 
opposite direction, respectively. Here we investigate corticomotor excitability during the observation of 
vertical oscillations of an index finger using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation. Motor Evoked Potentials 
were recorded from flexors and extensors of participants’ right index finger, placed in either a maximal 
comfortable flexion or extension position, with stimulations delivered at maximal flexion, maximal extension 
or mid-trajectory of the observed finger oscillations. Facilitation was found in participants’ flexors for in-
phase and anti-phase coordination but not for unstable 90Â° coordination, supporting the occurrence of 
dynamical motor entrainment. Interestingly, anti-phase motor facilitation contrasts with action simulation 
predictions as it involves activity in the motor system different from the one needed for the execution of the 
observed movement. These findings open new perspectives for understanding motor activity during action 
observation and the processes underlying interpersonal coordination.  
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Body ownership involves the integration of multiple sources of sensory input to produce the subjective 
feeling of self. The rubber hand illusion (RHI) has been used to examine how the feeling of self can be 
manipulated and transferred away from one’s own body to a fake hand. Previous studies have shown that 
components of multisensory integration, namely the timing and spatial relationships of visual stimulation of 
the rubber hand and tactile stimulation of the subject’s hand are important for the transference of body 
ownership underlying the illusion. However, inverse effectiveness, or the phenomenon where stimuli are 
integrated inversely proportional to their unisensory strength, has gone unstudied. In the present study, we 
manipulated stimulus strength in addition to stimulus synchrony to investigate inverse effectiveness. The 
experiment utilized a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design with factors: timing (synchrony/asynchrony), light amplitude 
(low/high) and tactile amplitude (low/high). Visual stimuli was delivered with an LED on the rubber hand and 
tactile stimuli delivered with a vibro-tactile motor on the subject’s hand. Proprioceptive drift was used to 
measure illusion salience. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant main effects for timing (F[1, 19] 
= 7.68, p < 0.05), light strength (F[1, 19] = 4.51, p < 0.05) and an interaction effect between tactile strength 
and timing (F[1, 19] = 7.49, p < 0.05) on proprioceptive drift. Together, these results suggest the RHI is similar 
to other known multisensory integrative processes that depend on the effectiveness of stimuli in addition 
to their timing and spatial relationships. 
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Familiar self-associated stimuli such as own face and own name are processed faster and more accurately 
than other familiar stimuli. Moreover, recent research on the “self-prioritization effect” has shown that 
similar bias can be observed in a perceptual matching task for a wide range of unfamiliar stimuli which have 
been rapidly associated with the self, such as geometric shapes, objects, and human faces. I will present the 
results of two studies investigating this effect in more detail using faces in a sequential matching task. In a 
sequential task participants are first presented with a label and then after a short delay they see a face. Their 
task is to judge whether the face matches with the label. By introducing a delay between presentation of 
labels and faces it was possible to separately investigate top-down and bottom-up contributions to the self-
prioritization effect. Our results suggest that there are at least two distinct processes underlying self-
prioritization reflecting these two contributions. The first one can be called a self-boost effect and manifests 
itself by generalized facilitated processing of the second stimulus if the first stimulus in a sequence was self-
associated. The second effect is represented by faster processing of the second stimulus, irrespective of what 
proceeds it. While the latter probably reflects increased familiarity, the first may reflect activation of an 
abstract self-concept, which in turn biases subsequent processing.  
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Body self-perception involves the integration of multisensory signals with stored body information to 
construct models of one’s own body identity, shape and location. Patients with Anorexia Nervosa (AN) report 
body perception distortions - they perceive their bodies as fat, but are objectively very thin. One hypothesis 
is that AN involves a change in the processing of multisensory bodily signals which causes discrepancies 
between how the body is perceived and what the body is physically like. Our research uses action-based 
paradigms to investigate body perception changes in AN. In this set of studies, we combined the Rubber 
Hand Illusion paradigm with a reaching paradigm to test if the impact of visual-proprioceptive and visual-
tactile signals on body location perception differs between AN and healthy control groups. For current AN 
patients we found significant group differences in shifts of reaching trajectories, indicating that the influence 
of proprioceptive signals on hand location estimates is reduced. Hand location estimates were relatively 
more biased towards external visual information. Data from a second study suggest that there are no group 
differences between recovered AN patients and healthy controls. Overall, our findings indicate that 
multisensory body location perception -- specifically the processing of visual-proprioceptive signals -- is 
changed in AN and is similar to healthy controls for recovered patients. 
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THE CONFERENCE IS SUPPORTED BY 
 
The ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders 
 
The ARC Centre of Excellence offers unique  
opportunities for interdisciplinary and  
international collaborative research in the  
study of cognition, its disorders, and their treatment. 
 
 
The methods workshop “Human Perspectives in the Science of Self” on Day 3 is 
supported by the Faculty of Human Sciences and the Department of Cognitive 
Science, Macquarie University. 
 
CONFERENCE SPONSORS 
 
Oculus Research 
 
At Oculus Research our goal is to make great consumer virtual, augmented, and mixed reality 
experiences that ship in five to ten years. Virtual reality today is a vast, highly interdisciplinary 
research space that has only begun to be explored; we are building a team capable of 
leapfrogging VR forward by bringing together researchers and engineers spanning a wide 
range of expertise. 
 
The Centre of Agency, Values and Ethics (CAVE), Macquarie University 
 
The Centre for Agency, Values, and Ethics (CAVE) provides a platform for interaction and 
collaboration between researchers in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, law, 
medicine, applied ethics and bioethics. A distinctive feature is its focus upon the 
philosophical, ethical and legal issues raised by the cognitive neurosciences. 
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Thank You! 
 
 
We would like to thank you for your involvement and participation!  
 
We will send you a survey for feedback shortly after the conference. For any 
additional feedback please feel free to send us an email:  
 
info@scienceofselfconference.org  
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Vince Polito, Regine Zopf, Simmy Poonian, Mariia Kaliuzhna 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
